LIVE COLLECTION PREVIEWApproved live sources · Extractive metadata only · Not for distribution
AlphaGen Research Ledger
Daily intelligence across markets, policy, companies, and research.
A provenance-first morning brief that separates reported facts, source views, analyst inference, and unresolved uncertainty.
Edition date2026-08-08 13:57 UTC
16Canonical inputs
4Source classes
19Source policies
19Live fetches
Coverage ledger
What this edition can monitor
Each source below was admitted by the code-owned policy registry. Failures and empty windows remain explicit.
Declared source policies and live access requirements
Source policy
Coverage
Trust
Live path
Method
Run status
Bank of England
Central banks
primary
Public web
RSS
collected (1)
Bank of Japan
Central banks
primary
Public web
RSS
collected (5)
European Central Bank
Central banks
primary
Public web
RSS
collected (1)
Federal Reserve
Central banks
primary
Public web
RSS
empty (0)
SEC EDGAR
Company filings
primary
Public API
API
empty (0)
BIS FSI publications
Institutional reports
primary
Public web
RSS
empty (0)
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Institutional reports
primary
Public web
RSS
failed (0) — authentication-failed
U.S. Energy Information Administration — Press Releases
Institutional reports
primary
Public web
RSS
empty (0)
U.S. Energy Information Administration — Today in Energy
Institutional reports
primary
Public web
RSS
collected (2)
CME DataMine entitlement
Market data
primary
Approval required
UNAVAILABLE
skipped (0) — approval-required
ECB Data Portal
Market data
primary
Public API
API
collected (1)
Eurostat — Economy and Finance
Market data
primary
Public web
RSS
empty (0)
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Market data
primary
Public web
RSS
collected (1)
GDELT Global News Discovery
Market news
reputable
Public API
API
failed (0) — rate-limited
Reuters Markets
Market news
reputable
Licensed feed
UNAVAILABLE
skipped (0) — license-required
Yahoo Finance
Market news
reputable
Approval required
UNAVAILABLE
skipped (0) — approval-required
arXiv Economics
Research papers
research
Public API
API
collected (5)
NBER working papers
Research papers
research
Public web
HTML
skipped (0) — connector-not-approved
Grok X market pulse
X social pulse
social
Credentialed API
API
skipped (0) — capability-not-configured
Chart 01
Source mix
Derived only from the canonical documents in this edition. The chart spec, dataset, renderer, and hashes are retained with the receipt.
Accessible data table for Edition coverage by source class
Source class
Documents
Market data
2
Central banks
7
Research papers
5
Institutional reports
2
Desk 01
Markets & narrative
02
Market dataprimary trustPublic web12:32 UTC
Major Economic Indicators Latest Numbers
Major Economic Indicators Latest Numbers
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary market data source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
ECB euro foreign exchange reference rates — U.S. dollar
2026-08-06: 1.1542 U.S. dollars per euro; 2026-08-07: 1.1535 U.S. dollars per euro. Source: ECB statistics; formatting and observation selection by AlphaGen.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary market data source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported fact2026-08-06: 1.1542 U.S. dollars per euro; 2026-08-07: 1.1535 U.S. dollars per euro. Source: ECB statistics; formatting and observation selection by AlphaGen.ECB Data API observations
Desk 02
Policy & institutions
09
Institutional reportsprimary trustPublic web14:00 UTC
Battery storage capacity averaged 70% growth over the last three years
Battery storage capacity averaged 70% growth over the last three years
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary institutional report source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factBattery storage capacity averaged 70% growth over the last three yearsofficial feed metadata
Central banksprimary trustPublic web08:00 UTC
ECB publishes consolidated banking data for end-March 2026
ECB publishes consolidated banking data for end-March 2026
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factECB publishes consolidated banking data for end-March 2026official feed metadata
Central banksprimary trustPublic web06:00 UTC
Amounts Outstanding in the Call Money Market (July)
Amounts Outstanding in the Call Money Market (July)
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Monetary Base and the Bank of Japan's Transactions (July)
Monetary Base and the Bank of Japan's Transactions (July)
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factMonetary Base and the Bank of Japan's Transactions (July)official feed metadata
Central banksprimary trustPublic web23:50 UTC
Bank of Japan's Transactions with the Government (July)
Bank of Japan's Transactions with the Government (July)
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factBank of Japan's Transactions with the Government (July)official feed metadata
Central banksprimary trustPublic web11:00 UTC
Green notice 2026/02
Green notice 2026/02
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary central bank source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Institutional reportsprimary trustPublic web14:00 UTC
The U.S.-Canada natural gas and electricity trade value rose in 2025
The U.S.-Canada natural gas and electricity trade value rose in 2025
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a primary institutional report source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factThe U.S.-Canada natural gas and electricity trade value rose in 2025official feed metadata
Desk 03
Companies & filings
00Desk 04
Research desk
05
Research papersresearch trustPublic API17:38 UTC
There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Equilibrium
I argue that there is a sense in which universal equilibrium (defined loosely) existence in games is incompatible with eschewing strictly dominated strategies and a sense in which it isn't.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a research research paper source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factI argue that there is a sense in which universal equilibrium (defined loosely) existence in games is incompatible with eschewing strictly dominated strategies and a sense in which it isn't.official feed metadata
Research papersresearch trustPublic API15:19 UTC
Stochastic Choice with Distribution-Dependent Preferences
We develop a continuous-time stochastic choice theory with endogenous preference evolution. Unlike dynamic random utility, observed behavior affects future preferences through the conditional distribution of latent preference states, generating endogenous distributional feedback. We show that this feedback has observable behavioral implications and characterize stochastic choice by a behavioral representation consisting of contemporaneous choice and continuation behavior. This representation is identified from stochastic choice, yields a rigidity result linking structural preference dynamics to observable behavior, and characterizes exactly when distribution dependent utility is behaviorally reducible to dynamic random utility. We further prove a behavioral impossibility theorem: stochastic choice arrays exhibiting behavioral distributional feedback admit no dynamic random utility representation. On the probabilistic side, we establish existence and weak uniqueness for the underlying conditional McKean-Vlasov system with conditional law feedback. The structure unifies endogenous information, latent preference dynamics, behavioral identification, and stochastic choice within a single continuous-time model.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a research research paper source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factWe develop a continuous-time stochastic choice theory with endogenous preference evolution. Unlike dynamic random utility, observed behavior affects future preferences through the conditional distribution of latent preference states, generating endogenous distributional feedback. We show that this feedback has observable behavioral implications and characterize stochastic choice by a behavioral representation consisting of contemporaneous choice and continuation behavior. This representation is identified from stochastic choice, yields a rigidity result linking structural preference dynamics to observable behavior, and characterizes exactly when distribution dependent utility is behaviorally reducible to dynamic random utility. We further prove a behavioral impossibility theorem: stochastic choice arrays exhibiting behavioral distributional feedback admit no dynamic random utility representation. On the probabilistic side, we establish existence and weak uniqueness for the underlying conditional McKean-Vlasov system with conditional law feedback. The structure unifies endogenous information, latent preference dynamics, behavioral identification, and stochastic choice within a single continuous-time model.official feed metadata
Research papersresearch trustPublic API15:07 UTC
Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Assembly, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities
We study double auctions for markets in which goods are valuable in bundles, such as data, model weights, and fine-tuned AI assets. A key friction in such markets is No Assembly: a platform may be unable, for legal or technical reasons, to combine components supplied by different sellers into a single bundle. We formulate a combinatorial buyer's-bid double auction under this constraint. Under explicit stability and price-influence conditions (maintained in general, and for two goods derived from local price-taking and a feedback bound), each bundle submarket inherits the large-market discipline of single-good double auctions: bid shading vanishes, and clearing prices concentrate on competitive levels and track the common value (price discovery). The key incentive step, that bidding on a bundle creates no first-order strategic distortion beyond the single-good logic, is proved for two goods; for larger item sets it remains a maintained condition. Multi-agent reinforcement-learning simulations decompose the welfare loss and indicate that No Assembly, not strategic shading, is the binding finite-market friction, with both losses small in moderately thick markets and declining with complementarity amongst goods.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a research research paper source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factWe study double auctions for markets in which goods are valuable in bundles, such as data, model weights, and fine-tuned AI assets. A key friction in such markets is No Assembly: a platform may be unable, for legal or technical reasons, to combine components supplied by different sellers into a single bundle. We formulate a combinatorial buyer's-bid double auction under this constraint. Under explicit stability and price-influence conditions (maintained in general, and for two goods derived from local price-taking and a feedback bound), each bundle submarket inherits the large-market discipline of single-good double auctions: bid shading vanishes, and clearing prices concentrate on competitive levels and track the common value (price discovery). The key incentive step, that bidding on a bundle creates no first-order strategic distortion beyond the single-good logic, is proved for two goods; for larger item sets it remains a maintained condition. Multi-agent reinforcement-learning simulations decompose the welfare loss and indicate that No Assembly, not strategic shading, is the binding finite-market friction, with both losses small in moderately thick markets and declining with complementarity amongst goods.official feed metadata
Research papersresearch trustPublic API14:48 UTC
Bartlett Couplings of the Onion and Vine LKJ Samplers
The extended-onion and C-vine constructions of Lewandowski, Kurowicka and Joe (2009) are standard methods for sampling from the $\mathrm{LKJ}_n(η)$ distribution on correlation matrices. We show that both arise from the simpler row-normalized Bartlett construction associated with the restricted-Wishart representation of Wang, Wu and Chu (2018), which reuses random quantities that the classical samplers regenerate. Two exact row-wise couplings establish this: the squared norm of the Gaussian vector supplying the onion's direction has exactly the Gamma law required for one component of the Beta radius, and the same vector, with one chi-squared variate, generates the entire row of mutually independent C-vine partial correlations with their required symmetric-Beta laws. Under gamma-ratio accounting, normalized Bartlett, the onion, and the conventional symmetric-Beta C-vine require $n-1$, $2(n-1)$, and $n(n-1)$ Gamma-equivalent calls. Controlled benchmarks confirm a low-dimensional advantage over the onion implementation and a persistent advantage over the C-vine implementations examined; direct Bartlett normalization also avoids subtractive complements, moving the small-$η$ zero-diagonal threshold from machine-epsilon scale toward the subnormal range. The sampler is valid for every real $η>0$ and requires only standard normal and chi-squared variates.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a research research paper source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factThe extended-onion and C-vine constructions of Lewandowski, Kurowicka and Joe (2009) are standard methods for sampling from the $\mathrm{LKJ}_n(η)$ distribution on correlation matrices. We show that both arise from the simpler row-normalized Bartlett construction associated with the restricted-Wishart representation of Wang, Wu and Chu (2018), which reuses random quantities that the classical samplers regenerate. Two exact row-wise couplings establish this: the squared norm of the Gaussian vector supplying the onion's direction has exactly the Gamma law required for one component of the Beta radius, and the same vector, with one chi-squared variate, generates the entire row of mutually independent C-vine partial correlations with their required symmetric-Beta laws. Under gamma-ratio accounting, normalized Bartlett, the onion, and the conventional symmetric-Beta C-vine require $n-1$, $2(n-1)$, and $n(n-1)$ Gamma-equivalent calls. Controlled benchmarks confirm a low-dimensional advantage over the onion implementation and a persistent advantage over the C-vine implementations examined; direct Bartlett normalization also avoids subtractive complements, moving the small-$η$ zero-diagonal threshold from machine-epsilon scale toward the subnormal range. The sampler is valid for every real $η>0$ and requires only standard normal and chi-squared variates.official feed metadata
Research papersresearch trustPublic API14:33 UTC
Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies.
Why it matters
Included because it passed the configured source policy and freshness window for a research research paper source. Materiality and causal analysis have not yet run.
Claim ledger
Reported factThis paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies.official feed metadata